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 I find this paper useful in many ways and agree with much of it, especially with Blair’s 
application of his concepts and distinctions to current disputes in the theory of argument. Since 
Blair warned me that he would be unable to read his complete paper and would be presenting it 
with likely variations from the wording in his text, I will for the most part avoid comments 
discussing wording of various points. Just in case I don’t have an opportunity to present my 
comments in full, I have also adopted the policy here of moving from broader concerns to 
narrower ones. 
 First I would like to comment on the expression “philosophy of argument.” I used this 
expression as the title of a recent book (Govier 1999) and Blair liked it and has taken it up here. 
To my knowledge, this phrase was not current before I used it. Here, Blair tells us that it is 
appropriate to use the term “philosophy of argument” to describe his account because the 
account involves a sorting out, classifying, defining, and framing of central terms of issues, and 
that classificatory work is then offered as a basis for understanding and action. This explanation 
is sensible enough as far as it goes; such conceptual work is indeed characteristic of philosophy. 
It can be argued that such conceptual work is necessary for doing philosophy, necessary in the 
sense that any philosophical work that does not explicitly incorporate it can be said to 
presuppose it. However, this conceptual organizing is also characteristic of theory construction in 
subjects other than philosophy. Thus the fact that an account incorporates such work is not a 
sufficient reason to call it “philosophy.” In constructing the title for my book, I considered 
‘philosophy of argument’ to be a proper way of describing what has also been called ‘informal 
logic,’ ‘argumentation theory,’ and ‘theory of argument’ because of some further features of 
these areas of study. One such feature, and the main one in my view, is the articulation and 
reflective exploration of relevant norms and in particular, norms of justification, evidence, 
reasoning, and truth, which have traditionally been central topics in philosophy. Another is the 
many links between the investigations in informal logic and the theory of argument of classic 
philosophical themes such as induction and deduction, the clarification of meaning, the nature of 
assumptions, and topics in formal logic and the philosophy of language. 
 Secondly, I would like to discuss a segment of Blair’s discussion that strikes me as 
somewhat unclear, but apparently plausible and interesting. Blair says that atomic arguments in 
his sense (or lines of argument or argumentation) can be put to any number of uses. He cites as 
uses conveying knowledge, altering opinions, showing one’s knowledge, persuading another to 
adopt a policy or action, exploring for oneself the pros and cons of a given position, and 
resolving a conflict. These objectives, Blair says, would not have to be achieved by offering and 
considering argument. They could be achieved in other ways. He offers no examples at this 
point, so I shall take the liberty of inventing some myself. Altering someone’s opinion by 
hypnosis would be an instance of altering it by some means other than offering him an argument. 
Appealing to a third party to make and enforce her decision as to the correct resolution of a 
conflict would count as resolving it by some means other than argument. In such cases, we might 
have used argument for the practical purpose, but we did not. We did something else. I accept 
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both Blair’s point that arguments can have these various uses and his further point that argument 
is not strictly needed for these purposes. But here is what is confusing. Blair says that the uses he 
has listed may be called intrinsic. In seeking to explain what he means by this, he says that what 
is usually wanted is that these ends be achieved by means of argument.  But who usually wants 
this? Why do they usually want it? Why do they want it usually, and not all the time? And if it’s 
not a desideratum all the time, why is this intrinsic? These are the sorts of things I want to ask. 
Nevertheless, I think that I have some idea what Blair means here. If I am right, the theme he is 
alluding to is important. I think what he means is that for conveying knowledge, altering opinion, 
demonstrating knowledge, persuading another to act, exploring pros and cons, or resolving a 
conflict, argument is a preferred mode. But if so, we need to ask why it is preferred, and why it 
should it be preferred.  
My answer would be that if one adopts an attitude on an argument, the proposition or 
action in question is supported by reasons; thus rationality is involved in the adoption of attitudes 
and the making of choices. One might even say that this reasoning is manifest (Johnson 2000).  
There is a difference between gaining a belief through hypnosis and gaining it by considering 
arguments for and against it and appraising the reasons and evidence for oneself (Adler 2002). 
There is also a difference between resolving a conflict by submitting it to a third party who can 
impose a solution and working out that conflict by a argumentative negotiation with the other 
parties involved in it. I think Blair presumes that a rationally reflective result is preferable to a 
result gained in some other way. If that’s so, I agree, but I urge that it would be useful and 
interesting to clarify the account on this point. 
 I now shift to consider several more technical issues. 
(a)        In my written version of this presentation, Blair says on page 2 that “the smallest unit 
of argument consists of a reason to take (that is, maintain, adopt or change) an attitude towards 
a proposition or towards an event or state of affairs or property, or an action of policy.” This, 
he says, is an atomic argument. From this way of stating the matter, I gain the distinct 
impression that the argument is what in standard parlance would be called the premise  ¸though 
Blair does not want to say this, because he thinks a reason can be several linked premises. But 
perhaps “a reason to take an attitude” is a premise plus some sort of inference or mental 
inclination to move from the premise to something else. In any event, a reason for X would not 
include X itself. Thus it would appear that the smallest unit of argument does not include what 
would one would traditionally refer to as the conclusion. If R is a reason for X, then, on the 
usage Blair proposes, R is the argument. The argument is NOT ‘R, so X.’  
                I find this usage confusing, the more so because Blair later seems to relate his 
notion of atomic argument to what others (Johnson 2000) have called the illative core of an 
argument, and the illative core does include premises and conclusion. My unease is only 
increased when Blair later states that by “atomic argument” he does not mean a premise, and 
reminds us that he is not presupposing that only propositions can serve as reasons. I think Blair 
needs to do further work here. My own preference would be for a more traditional model in 
which atomic arguments have one or more premises and have a conclusion, and all these are 
expressed in the form of propositions. I do not think that Blair’s important broader position 
about logical, dialectical, and rhetorical aspects of argument and perspectives from which 
arguments can be evaluated would have to change if one were to amend his account in this 
way. For example, one could allow for emotions providing reasons for attitudes by recasting 
the content of those emotions and attitudes in the form of propositions.  I suspect that Blair will 
not want to go this route. But he needs a more precise account of the atomic argument, the role 
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of propositional premises and conclusions within it, and the relationship between his account 
and more orthodox accounts of the illative core. 
(b) There seems to be inconsistency on another key question, which is whether the term 
“argument” is being used as a success term. In my version, on page 2 Blair speaks of an atomic 
argument as one that by itself will have made an action or attitude more reasonable than it 
otherwise would be. This way of talking requires that ‘argument’ be a success term. Later on 
the same page Blair says that considerations  put forward may be taken to be reasons or 
presented as reasons, even though they do not in fact constitute reasons. When that happens, 
are there arguments? It would seem that there are not, if we follow up on the idea that the 
atomic argument will make an action or attitude more reasonable. And yet Blair soon shifts to 
allow that “we also identify as arguments things that are taken to make an attitude or action 
more reasonable even though they do not, and things that are offered as making an attitude or 
action more reasonable, although they do not.” He notes with apparent approval that people 
speak of there being logically bad arguments, saying that the appraisal of arguments can place 
them on a spectrum of weak to strong. Thus his account is contradictory, on the issue of 
whether “argument” is a success term. I would propose that Blair stick with his second point 
here, allowing that when R is presented as a reason for X, an argument is offered, whether or 
not R really constitutes a reason for X.  
      (c ) Blair’s account strikes me as especially fruitful and helpful in its distinction of the 
logic, the dialectical, and the rhetorical as three different perspectives on argument and 
argumentation, rather than as three distinct modes of argument. The wording of his account 
strikes me as painfully awkward, however, insofar as he speaks of reasons as entailing or 
making plausible or probable attitudes. I would prefer a somewhat tighter and more classic 
usage. If R is a reason for X and a reason that actually entails X, then R and X had better be 
propositions, so that we can understand and articulate what entailment amounts to in this 
context. Now suppose that a person P accepts R as a reason for X in the sense that he believe R 
to be true and understands that R entails X. Suppose that on that basis he is rationally 
persuaded that X is true. If one wishes to describe this shift in terms of attitudes (I myself 
would prefer to speak of beliefs or opinions), we can say that P has been given reason to adopt 
a particular attitude towards X, namely the attitude of accepting X as true.  Again, I don’t know 
whether Blair will regard this sort of re-conceptualization as a friendly amendment, but I think 
it could be understood as such. 
      (d) For anyone who should happen to be interested, I would like to note that my own 
perspective on arguments and argumentation is predominantly logical with only occasional 
shifts into the dialectical and rhetorical. 
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